Non-Exclusive Dealing with Retailer Differentiation and Market Penetration

Shengyu Li and Rong Luo

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2020, vol. 70, issue C

Abstract: Retailer differentiation exists in most industries and gives manufacturers an incentive to contract with different retailers to penetrate a market. This paper analyzes the impact of this penetration effect on vertical contract exclusivity in an oligopolistic model with differentiated retailers. In the model, manufacturers endogenously choose contract types and negotiate with retailers on wholesale prices. We show that, when the penetration effect is sufficiently strong, non-exclusive contracts lead to higher profits for the manufacturers and retailers. The model is applied to an example with logit demand, which shows that both manufacturers choosing the non-exclusive contracts is a dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium even though they may both be better off under exclusive contracts when the products have high quality or low costs.

Keywords: Non-exclusive contract; Market penetration; Retailer differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:70:y:2020:i:c:s0167718720300138

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102591

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