Cartel stability in experimental first-price sealed-bid and English auctions

Jeroen Hinloopen, Sander Onderstal and Leonard Treuren

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2020, vol. 71, issue C

Abstract: Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we observe that bidding rings are more stable in the English auction than in the first-price sealed-bid auction. In both conditions, the first-price sealed-bid auction dominates the English auction in terms of average revenue and the revenue spread. The English auction outperforms the first-price sealed-bid auction in terms of efficiency.

Keywords: Cartel stability; English auction; First-price sealed-bid auction; Laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D44 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:71:y:2020:i:c:s0167718720300655

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102642

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