Persuading to participate: Coordination on a standard

Benjamin Balzer and Johannes Schneider

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2021, vol. 78, issue C

Abstract: We study coordination among competitors in the shadow of a market mechanism. Our main example is standard setting: either firms coordinate through a standard-setting organization (SSO), or a market solution—a standards war—emerges. A firms veto to participate in the SSO triggers a standards war. Participation constraints are demanding, and the optimal SSO can involve on-path vetoes. We show that vetoes are effectively deterred if firms can (partially) release their private information to the public. We discuss several business practices that can serve as a signaling device to provide that information and to effectively ensure coordination.

Keywords: Innovation; Standard-setting organizations; Patents; Persuasion; Coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D83 L24 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718721000576
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:78:y:2021:i:c:s0167718721000576

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102764

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Industrial Organization is currently edited by P. Bajari, B. Caillaud and N. Gandal

More articles in International Journal of Industrial Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().