Contracts as a barrier to entry: Impact of Buyer’s asymmetric information and bargaining power

David Martimort, Jerome Pouyet and Thomas Tregouet

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2021, vol. 79, issue C

Abstract: An incumbent seller contracts with a buyer under the threat of entry. The contract stipulates a price and a penalty for breach if the buyer later switches to the entrant. Sellers are heterogenous in terms of the gross surplus they provide to the buyer. The buyer is privately informed on her valuation for the incumbent’s service. Asymmetric information makes the incumbent favor entry as it helps screening buyers. When the entrant has some bargaining power vis-à-vis the buyer and keeps a share of the gains from entry, the incumbent instead wants to reduce entry. The compounding effect of these two forces may lead to either excessive entry or foreclosure, and possibly to a fixed rebate for exclusivity which is afforded to all buyers.

Keywords: Foreclosure; Excessive entry; Exclusionary behavior; Incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Contracts as a Barrier to Entry: Impact of Buyer's Asymmetric Information and Bargaining Power (2021)
Working Paper: Contracts as a Barrier to Entry: Impact of Buyer's Asymmetric Information and Bargaining Power (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:79:y:2021:i:c:s0167718721000837

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102791

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