The Anticompetitiveness of a Private Information Exchange of Prices

Joseph E. Harrington

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2022, vol. 85, issue C

Abstract: Competitors privately sharing price intentions is universally prohibited under antitrust/competition law. In contrast, there is no common well-accepted treatment of competitors privately sharing prices. This paper is the first to show that a private exchange of prices can result in higher prices for consumers. Conditions relevant to determining when such an information exchange is anticompetitive are identified.

Keywords: Infomaton exchange; Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:85:y:2022:i:c:s0167718721000850

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102793

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