Does standardized information in online markets disproportionately benefit job applicants from less developed countries?
Ajay Agrawal,
Nicola Lacetera and
Elizabeth Lyons
Journal of International Economics, 2016, vol. 103, issue C, 1-12
Abstract:
We examine trade in services between employers from developed countries (DCs) and workers from less developed countries (LDCs) on an online platform for contract labor. We report evidence that 1) DC employers are less likely to hire LDC compared to DC workers even after controlling for a wide range of observables, 2) workers with standardized and verified work history information are more likely to be hired, and 3) information on verified work history disproportionately benefits LDC contractors. The LDC premium also applies to additional outcomes including wage bids, obtaining an interview, and being shortlisted. In addition, the evidence suggests that informational limits to trade may be addressed through a variety of market design approaches; for instance, an online monitoring tool substitutes for verified work history information.
Keywords: Digital markets; Trade in services; Information standardization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F16 J20 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:inecon:v:103:y:2016:i:c:p:1-12
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.08.003
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