Do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements?

Paola Conconi and Carlo Perroni

Journal of International Economics, 2009, vol. 79, issue 1, 160-170

Abstract: We examine the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy reputation when both are self-sustaining. We show that domestic policy commitment does not necessarily facilitate international cooperation; rather, efficient policies may be most easily sustained when governments are unable to pre-commit to policy domestically. Moreover, the lack of domestic commitment is more likely to facilitate international cooperation the larger the international spillovers of domestic policies are.

Keywords: International; agreements; Policy; commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements? (2009)
Working Paper: Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements? (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:inecon:v:79:y:2009:i:1:p:160-170

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