Do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements?

Paola Conconi and Carlo Perroni

Journal of International Economics, 2009, vol. 79, issue 1, 160-170

Abstract: We examine the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy reputation when both are self-sustaining. We show that domestic policy commitment does not necessarily facilitate international cooperation; rather, efficient policies may be most easily sustained when governments are unable to pre-commit to policy domestically. Moreover, the lack of domestic commitment is more likely to facilitate international cooperation the larger the international spillovers of domestic policies are.

Keywords: International; agreements; Policy; commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022-1996(09)00094-4
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements? (2009)
Working Paper: Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements? (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:inecon:v:79:y:2009:i:1:p:160-170

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of International Economics is currently edited by Martin Uribe and Costas Arkolakis

More articles in Journal of International Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().