Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements?
Paola Conconi () and
ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles
We examine the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy reputation when both are self-sustaining. We show that domestic policy commitment does not necessarily facilitate international cooperation; rather, efficient policies may be most easily sustained when governments are unable to pre-commit to policy domestically. Moreover, the lack of domestic commitment is more likely to facilitate international cooperation the larger the international spillovers of domestic policies are.
Keywords: International agreements; Policy commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
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Published in: Journal of international economics (2009) v.79,p.160-170
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Journal Article: Do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements? (2009)
Working Paper: Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements? (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/98549
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