 Modelling the Triple Helix of university-industry-government relationships with game theory: Core, Shapley value and nucleolus as indicators of synergy within an innovation systemEustache Mêgnigbêto Journal of Informetrics, 2018, vol. 12, issue 4, 1118-1132 Abstract: The Triple Helix of university-industry-government relationships is a three-person cooperative game with transferable utility. The core, the Shapley value and the nucleolus are suggested as indicators to measure the synergy between innovation actors. The core is the expression of actors’ interests and constraints exerted on them; it measures the extent of the synergy. The Shapley value indicates actors’ strength to lead to and create synergy; and the nucleolus determines the power of coalitions to maintain synergy. The Triple Helix games of the South Korean and the West African innovation systems are studied, based on bibliographic data collected from Web of Science over a ten-year period (2001–2010). Results show that the core of South Korea is larger than that of West Africa, meaning that synergy occurs more within the South Korean innovation system than in the West African one. University has more power to lead to and create synergy and coalitions involving government work in order to maintain synergy. Keywords: Triple Helix; Innovation; Synergy; Game theory; Core; Nucleolus; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:infome:v:12:y:2018:i:4:p:1118-1132 DOI: 10.1016/j.joi.2018.09.005 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Informetrics is currently edited by Leo Egghe More articles in Journal of Informetrics from Elsevier |
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