Academics as rent seekers: distorted incentives in higher education, with reference to the South African case
International Journal of Educational Development, 2017, vol. 52, issue C, 58-67
The behavior of academics and academic institutions is examined through the concept of rent seeking, in which organizations or individuals expend resources to obtain ‘artificially contrived transfers’. International ranking systems, publication-based incentives, and grant awarding processes, all encourage and reward rent seeking behavior: participants engage in distorted, costly behavior to obtain rewards, including public funds, without regard to the social value of these activities. This may be especially damaging in developing countries. Detailed examples from South Africa's higher education system illustrate such behavior and its relation to policy. The paper concludes by sketching an outline of some possible solutions.
Keywords: Incentives; Higher education; Rent seeking; Educational policy; Corporatization; Rankings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:injoed:v:52:y:2017:i:c:p:58-67
Access Statistics for this article
International Journal of Educational Development is currently edited by Stephen P Heyneman
More articles in International Journal of Educational Development from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().