Assessing the robustness of the relationship between financial reforms and banking crises
Pablo Gluzmann () and
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 2017, vol. 49, issue C, 32-47
This paper provides a novel approach for assessing the robustness of the relationship between different types of financial reforms and banking crises for the period 1973–2005. We document the following facts for emerging economies: (i) liberalizations of capital accounts, securities markets, interest rates, removal of credit controls, barriers to entry, and reduction of state ownership in the banking sector, all are positively associated with a higher frequency of banking crises; (ii) the increase in financial turbulence is mainly concentrated within a time-window of five years after the reforms: If a country does not experience a banking crisis within that period, the probability of experiencing a crisis afterwards becomes insignificant; and (iii) the results are robust to the inclusion of all control variables that have been found in the literature as significant determinants of banking crises.
Keywords: Financial reforms; Banking crises; Robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 F36 F62 G01 G15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:intfin:v:49:y:2017:i:c:p:32-47
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