Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe

A. Mitchell Polinsky ()

International Review of Law and Economics, 2006, vol. 26, issue 3, 323-335

Date: 2006
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Working Paper: Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe (2004)
Working Paper: Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe (2004)
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