Details about A. Mitchell Polinsky

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Workplace:	Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), Stanford University, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by A. Mitchell Polinsky.

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Short-id: ppo94

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Working Papers

2019

1. Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

2017

2. Deterrence and the Optimal Use of Prison, Parole, and Probation
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
3. Prison Work Programs in a Model of Deterrence
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (2)
   See also Journal Article Prison Work Programs in a Model of Deterrence, American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association (2017) View citations (2) (2017)
4. Subrogation and the Theory of Insurance When Suits Can Be Brought for Losses Suffered
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

2015

5. Deterrence and the Optimality of Rewarding Prisoners for Good Behavior
   Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research View citations (4)
   See also Journal Article Deterrence and the optimality of rewarding prisoners for good behavior, International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier (2015) View citations (3) (2015)

2012

6. Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
   Also in Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (2012)
   See also Journal Article Costly litigation and optimal damages, International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier (2014) View citations (7) (2014)

2007

7. A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies
   Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics View citations (3)
   Also in Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics (2006) View citations (2)
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc (2005)
   Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (2005)

2006

8. Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (9)
   Also in Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (2006) View citations (11)
   See also Journal Article Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press (2012) View citations (33) (2012)
9. Public Enforcement of Law
   Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research View citations (7)
   See also Chapter Public Enforcement of Law, Chapters, Edward Elgar Publishing (2009) View citations (11) (2009)
10. The Deadweight Loss of Coupon Remedies for Price Overcharges
    Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article THE DEADWEIGHT LOSS OF COUPON REMEDIES FOR PRICE OVERCHARGES*, Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell (2008) View citations (2) (2008)

2005

11. Economic Analysis of Law
    Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research View citations (7)
12. The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (6)
    Also in Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (2005) View citations (6)
    See also Chapter The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier (2007) View citations (137) (2007)

2004

13. Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (5)
    Also in Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (2004) View citations (5)
    See also Journal Article Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe, International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier (2006) View citations (9) (2006)
14. Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts
    Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany
    Also in American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings, American Law & Economics Association
    Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley (2003) View citations (1)
    Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics (2003) View citations (1)
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc (2003) View citations (1)
15. The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (2)
    Also in Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (2004) View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article The optimal use of fines and imprisonment when wealth is unobservable, Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier (2006) View citations (15) (2006)

2001

16. A Note on Settlements under the Contingent Fee Method of Compensating Lawyers
    Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article A note on settlements under the contingent fee method of compensating lawyers, International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier (2002) View citations (11) (2002)
17. Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients
    Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics View citations (8)
    See also Journal Article Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients, American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association (2003) View citations (41) (2003)

1999

18. Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement
    Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics View citations (1)
    Also in NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc (1999) View citations (13)
    See also Journal Article Corruption and optimal law enforcement, Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier (2001) View citations (144) (2001)
19. The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (24)
    See also Journal Article The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association (2000) View citations (679) (2000)

1997

20. On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (3)
    See also Journal Article On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press (1999) View citations (40) (1999)

1993

21. Optimal Awards and Penalties when the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs, RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation (1996) View citations (19) (1996)
22. Should Liability be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (5)

1992

23. Optimal Cleanup and Liability After Environmentally Harmful Discharges
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (4)

1991

24. A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (59)
    See also Journal Article A model of optimal fines for repeat offenders, Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier (1991) View citations (65) (1991)
25. Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (79)
    See also Journal Article Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation, RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation (1991) View citations (84) (1991)

1990

26. A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (35)
    See also Journal Article A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies among Individuals, American Economic Review, American Economic Association (1991) View citations (59) (1991)
27. Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (3)
    See also Journal Article Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines, Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press (1992) View citations (90) (1992)

1987

28. Optimal Liability when the Injurer's Information about the Victim's Loss is Imperfect
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
    See also Journal Article Optimal liability when the injurer's information about the victim's loss is imperfect, International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier (1987) (1987)

1986

29. A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlements and Litigation Costs
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (2)
30. Detrebling versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (5)
31. Fixed Price Versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
    See also Journal Article Fixed Price versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press (1987) View citations (6) (1987)
32. The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation in the Theory of Liability
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (2)

1982

33. Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power, Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation (1983) View citations (70) (1983)
34. The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (14)
    See also Journal Article The optimal use of fines and imprisonment, Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier (1984) View citations (127) (1984)

1981

35. Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article Pigouvian taxation with administrative costs, Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier (1982) View citations (30) (1982)
36. Risk Sharing through Breach of Contract Remedies
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (2)

1980

37. Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (12)
38. Strict Liability versus Negligence in a Market Setting
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (17)

1979

39. Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (10)

1978

40. On the Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article On the Choice between Property Rules and Liability Rules, Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International (1980) View citations (4) (1980)

Journal Articles

2017

1. Prison Work Programs in a Model of Deterrence
   American Law and Economics Review, 2017, 19, (2), 391-422 View citations (2)
   See also Working Paper Prison Work Programs in a Model of Deterrence, NBER Working Papers (2017) View citations (2) (2017)

2015

2. Deterrence and the optimality of rewarding prisoners for good behavior
   International Review of Law and Economics, 2015, 44, (C), 1-7 View citations (3)
   See also Working Paper Deterrence and the Optimality of Rewarding Prisoners for Good Behavior, Discussion Papers (2015) View citations (4) (2015)

2014

3. Costly litigation and optimal damages
   International Review of Law and Economics, 2014, 37, (C), 86-89 View citations (7)
   See also Working Paper Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages, NBER Working Papers (2012) (2012)

2012

4. Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks
   The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2012, 28, (2), 360-379 View citations (33)
   See also Working Paper Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks, NBER Working Papers (2006) View citations (9) (2006)

2008

5. THE DEADWEIGHT LOSS OF COUPON REMEDIES FOR PRICE OVERCHARGES*
   Journal of Industrial Economics, 2008, 56, (2), 402-417 View citations (2)
   See also Working Paper The Deadweight Loss of Coupon Remedies for Price Overcharges, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series (2006) View citations (2) (2006)

2006

6. Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe
   International Review of Law and Economics, 2006, 26, (3), 323-335 View citations (9)
   See also Working Paper Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe, NBER Working Papers (2004) View citations (5) (2004)
7. The optimal use of fines and imprisonment when wealth is unobservable
   Journal of Public Economics, 2006, 90, (4-5), 823-835 View citations (15)
   See also Working Paper The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable, NBER Working Papers (2004) View citations (2) (2004)

2003

8. Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients
   American Law and Economics Review, 2003, 5, (1), 165-188 View citations (41)
   See also Working Paper Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series (2001) View citations (8) (2001)

2002

9. A note on settlements under the contingent fee method of compensating lawyers
   International Review of Law and Economics, 2002, 22, (2), 217-225 View citations (11)
   See also Working Paper A Note on Settlements under the Contingent Fee Method of Compensating Lawyers, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series (2001) View citations (1) (2001)

2001

10. Corruption and optimal law enforcement
    Journal of Public Economics, 2001, 81, (1), 1-24 View citations (144)
    See also Working Paper Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series (1999) View citations (1) (1999)

2000

11. The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
    Journal of Economic Literature, 2000, 38, (1), 45-76 View citations (679)
    See also Working Paper The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, NBER Working Papers (1999) View citations (24) (1999)

1999

12. On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence
    The Journal of Legal Studies, 1999, 28, (1), 1-16 View citations (40)
    See also Working Paper On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, NBER Working Papers (1997) View citations (3) (1997)

1998

13. Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?
    The Journal of Legal Studies, 1998, 27, (1), 141-57 View citations (14)
    Also in The Journal of Legal Studies, 1998, 27, (2), 519-35 (1998) View citations (13)
14. On offense history and the theory of deterrence
    International Review of Law and Economics, 1998, 18, (3), 305-324 View citations (51)

1997

15. Are Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational? A Comment on Eisenberg et al
    The Journal of Legal Studies, 1997, 26, (2), 663-77 View citations (9)

1996

16. Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1996, 27, (2), 269-280 View citations (19)
    See also Working Paper Optimal Awards and Penalties when the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs, NBER Working Papers (1993) View citations (1) (1993)

1993

17. Should employees be subject to fines and imprisonment given the existence of corporate liability?
    International Review of Law and Economics, 1993, 13, (3), 239-257 View citations (48)

1992

18. Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines
    Journal of Law and Economics, 1992, 35, (1), 133-48 View citations (90)
    See also Working Paper Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines, NBER Working Papers (1990) View citations (3) (1990)

1991

19. A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies among Individuals
    American Economic Review, 1991, 81, (3), 618-21 View citations (59)
    See also Working Paper A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals, NBER Working Papers (1990) View citations (35) (1990)
20. A model of optimal fines for repeat offenders
    Journal of Public Economics, 1991, 46, (3), 291-306 View citations (65)
    See also Working Paper A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders, NBER Working Papers (1991) View citations (59) (1991)
21. Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1991, 22, (4), 562-570 View citations (84)
    See also Working Paper Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation, NBER Working Papers (1991) View citations (79) (1991)

1989

22. Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law
    The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1989, 5, (1), 99-108 View citations (73)

1988

23. The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability
    The Journal of Legal Studies, 1988, 17, (1), 151-64 View citations (30)
24. The deterrent effects of settlements and trials
    International Review of Law and Economics, 1988, 8, (1), 109-116 View citations (40)

1987

25. Fixed Price versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation
    The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1987, 3, (1), 27-46 View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper Fixed Price Versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation, NBER Working Papers (1986) (1986)
26. Optimal liability when the injurer's information about the victim's loss is imperfect
    International Review of Law and Economics, 1987, 7, (2), 139-147
    See also Working Paper Optimal Liability when the Injurer's Information about the Victim's Loss is Imperfect, NBER Working Papers (1987) (1987)

1984

27. The optimal use of fines and imprisonment
    Journal of Public Economics, 1984, 24, (1), 89-99 View citations (127)
    See also Working Paper The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, NBER Working Papers (1982) View citations (14) (1982)

1983

28. Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power
    Bell Journal of Economics, 1983, 14, (2), 581-589 View citations (70)
    See also Working Paper Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power, NBER Working Papers (1982) View citations (1) (1982)

1982

29. Pigouvian taxation with administrative costs
    Journal of Public Economics, 1982, 19, (3), 385-394 View citations (30)
    See also Working Paper Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs, NBER Working Papers (1981) View citations (2) (1981)

1980

30. On the Choice between Property Rules and Liability Rules
    Economic Inquiry, 1980, 18, (2), 233-46 View citations (4)
    See also Working Paper On the Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules, NBER Working Papers (1978) View citations (2) (1978)
31. Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting
    American Economic Review, 1980, 70, (2), 363-67 View citations (58)
32. The efficiency of paying compensation in the Pigovian solution to externality problems
    Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1980, 7, (2), 142-148 View citations (2)

1979

33. An Empirical Reconciliation of Micro and Grouped Estimates of the Demand for Housing
    The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1979, 61, (2), 199-205 View citations (66)
34. Notes on the Symmetry of Taxes and Subsidies in Pollution Control
    Canadian Journal of Economics, 1979, 12, (1), 75-83 View citations (17)
35. The Demand for Housing: An Empirical Postscript
    Econometrica, 1979, 47, (2), 521-23 View citations (5)
36. The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines
    American Economic Review, 1979, 69, (5), 880-91 View citations (225)

1978

37. Amenities and property values in a model of an urban area: A reply
    Journal of Public Economics, 1978, 9, (1), 111-112
38. Economics and Law: Discussion
    American Economic Review, 1978, 68, (2), 435-36
39. The long-run effects of a residential property tax and local public services
    Journal of Urban Economics, 1978, 5, (2), 241-262 View citations (16)

1977

40. The Demand for Housing: A Study in Specification and Grouping
    Econometrica, 1977, 45, (2), 447-61 View citations (41)

1976

41. Amenities and property values in a model of an urban area
    Journal of Public Economics, 1976, 5, (1-2), 119-129 View citations (58)

1975

42. The Air Pollution and Property Value Debate
    The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1975, 57, (1), 100-104 View citations (10)

1972

43. Probabilistic Compensation Criteria
    The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1972, 86, (3), 407-425 View citations (8)

Edited books

2007

1. Handbook of Law and Economics, vol 1
   Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier View citations (363)
2. Handbook of Law and Economics, vol 2
   Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier View citations (363)

Chapters

2009

1. Public Enforcement of Law
   Chapter 1 in Criminal Law and Economics, 2009 View citations (11)
   See also Working Paper Public Enforcement of Law, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (2006) View citations (7) (2006)
2. Punitive Damages
   Chapter 9 in Tort Law and Economics, 2009

2007

3. Preface
   Elsevier
   Also in Elsevier (2007)
4. The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
   Elsevier View citations (137)
   See also Working Paper The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc (2005) View citations (6) (2005)

Editor

1. Handbook of Law and Economics
   Elsevier
2. Handbook of Law and Economics
   Elsevier