Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts

A. Mitchell Polinsky () and Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series from Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Abstract: This article evaluates two different remedies for consumers who have been injured by a price overcharge on the sale of a good. Under a coupon remedy, injured consumers are awarded coupons that can be used for a limited period of time to purchase the good at a price below that which prevails after the overcharge has been eliminated, that is, below the competitive price. Under a discount remedy, any consumer, without proof of injury, may purchase the good for a limited period of time at a price that is set below the competitive price. Both remedies generally cause consumers to buy an excessive amount of the good during the remedy period. Under the coupon remedy only a subset of consumers are affected in this way (those holding a relatively high number of coupons), while under the discount remedy all consumers are affected. We show nonetheless that the resulting deadweight loss could be lower under the discount remedy. We also consider how the deadweight loss changes when the length of the remedy period is increased.

Keywords: price fixing; antitrust remedies; coupons; discounts; deadweight loss (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-11-30
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: REMEDIES FOR PRICE OVERCHARGES: THE DEADWEIGHT LOSS OF COUPONS AND DISCOUNTS (2003)
Working Paper: Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts (2003)
Working Paper: Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts
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