Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment

A. Mitchell Polinsky () and Steven Shavell ()

No 26083, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The prison time actually served by a convicted criminal depends to a significant degree on decisions made by the state during the course of imprisonment—notably, on whether to grant parole. We study a model of the adjustment of sentences assuming that the state’s objective is the optimal deterrence of crime. In the model, the state can lower or raise a criminal’s initial sentence on the basis of deterrence-relevant information obtained during imprisonment. Our focus on sentence adjustment as a means of promoting deterrence stands in contrast to the usual emphasis in sentence adjustment policy on avoiding recidivism.

JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-mic and nep-ore
Note: LE
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Published as A Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2021. "Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment," American Law and Economics Review, vol 23(2), pages 481-519.

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