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Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment

A. Mitchell Polinsky () and Steven Shavell ()

No 26083, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The prison time actually served by a convicted criminal depends to a significant degree on decisions made by the state during the course of imprisonment—on whether to grant parole or other forms of sentence reduction. In this article we study a model of the adjustment of sentences assuming that the state’s objective is the optimal deterrence of crime. In the model, the state can lower or raise the sentence based on deterrence-relevant information that it obtains about a criminal during imprisonment. Our focus on sentence adjustment as a means of promoting deterrence stands in contrast to the usual emphasis in sentence adjustment policy on reducing recidivism.

JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-mic and nep-ore
Note: LE
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