On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence

A. Mitchell Polinsky () and Steven Shavell ()

No 6259, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This article studies the implications for the theory of deterrence of (a) the manner in" which individuals' disutility from imprisonment varies with the length of the imprisonment" term; and (b) discounting of the future disutility and future public costs of imprisonment. Two" questions are addressed: Is deterrence enhanced more by increasing the length of imprisonment" terms or instead by raising the likelihood of imposing imprisonment? What is the optimal" combination of the severity and probability of imprisonment sanctions?"

JEL-codes: K14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-11
Note: LE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 28, no. 1 (January 1999): 1-16.

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Journal Article: On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence (1999)
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