A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies

A. Mitchell Polinsky () and Daniel L. Rubinfeld

No 11227, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This article studies optimal remedies in a setting in which damages vary among plaintiffs and are difficult to determine. We show that giving plaintiffs a choice between cash and coupons to purchase units of the defendant's product at a discount -- a "coupon-cash remedy" -- is superior to cash alone. The optimal coupon-cash remedy offers a cash amount that is less than the value of the coupons to plaintiffs who suffer relatively high harm. Such a remedy induces these plaintiffs to choose coupons, and plaintiffs who suffer relatively low harm to choose cash. Sorting plaintiffs in this way leads to better deterrence because the costs borne by defendants (the cash payments and the cost of providing coupons) more closely approximate the harms that they have caused.

JEL-codes: D18 D82 D83 H23 K19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Note: LE
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Published as Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. "A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3, 3 (October 2007): 653-61.

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies (2007)
Working Paper: A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies (2006)
Working Paper: A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies (2005)
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