Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs

A. Mitchell Polinsky () and Steven Shavell ()

No 742, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper examines how the optimal Pigouvian tax should be adjusted to reflect administrative costs. Several cases are examined, depending on whether the administrative costs are fixed per firm taxed or are a function of the amount of tax collected, and on whether such costs are borne by the government or by the taxed firm. In some cases, the presence of administrative costs increases the optimal tax above the external cost, while in other cases it leads to a decrease in the tax.

Date: 1981-09
Note: LE
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Published as Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Shavell, Steven. "Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs." Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 19, No. 3 (December 1982) , pp. 385-394.

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