Public Enforcement of Law

A. Mitchell Polinsky () and Steven Shavell
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Steven Shavell: Harvard University

No 05-016, Discussion Papers from Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This entry for the forthcoming The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Second Edition) surveys the economic analysis of public enforcement of law — the use of public agents (inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. We first discuss the basic elements of the theory: the probability of imposition of sanctions, the magnitude and form of sanctions (fines, imprisonment), and the rule of liability. We then examine a variety of extensions, including the costs of imposing fines, mistake, marginal deterrence, settlement, self-reporting, repeat offenses, and incapacitation.

Keywords: fines; imprisonment; probability of detection; sanctions; crime; enforcement; strict liability; fault-based liability; mistake; marginal deterrence; settlement; self-reporting; repeat offenses; incapacitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Chapter: Public Enforcement of Law (2009)
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