On the Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules

A. Mitchell Polinsky ()

No 286, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: When parties can bargain with each other in an externality situation, it is frequently argued that liability rules are preferable to property rules. The case for liability rules is thought to be strongest when the parties behave strategically, when the collective authority responsible for maximizing social welfare has perfect information, and when lump-sum transfers are not available. It is shown here that liability rules are not generally preferable to property rules in these circumstances because of their limited ability to redistribute income between the parties.

Date: 1978-10
Note: LE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Polinsky, A. Mitchell. "On the Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules." Economic Inquiry Vol. 18, No. 2, (April 1980), pp. 233-246.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w0286.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On the Choice between Property Rules and Liability Rules (1980)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:0286

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w0286

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().