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Strategic delegation and “judicial couples” in the Italian Constitutional Court

Fabio Padovano () and Nadia Fiorino

International Review of Law and Economics, 2012, vol. 32, issue 2, 215-223

Abstract: We analyze the selection of the Justice Reporter by the Justice President of the Italian Constitutional Court, the most important form of agenda setting power and act of delegation in decisions of constitutional (il)legitimacy. We estimate a series of econometric models that evaluate the relative importance of the determinants of the creation of these “judicial couples”, namely, professional background, political affiliation, age, etc. Professional background is shown to be an important determinant of the creation of the couples, more so with time, although the onset of the Second Republic has reduced its importance. This analysis sheds light into the inner workings of the Italian Constitutional Court and the actual processes through which its jurisprudence is generated.

Keywords: Constitutional Court; Agenda setting; Delegation; Judicial independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Working Paper: Strategic delegation and "judicial couples" in the Italian Constitutional Court (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:32:y:2012:i:2:p:215-223

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2012.01.002

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