Economics at your fingertips  

Strategic delegation and "judicial couples" in the Italian Constitutional Court

Fabio Padovano () and Nadia Fiorino

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We analyze the selection of the Justice Reporter by the Justice President of the Italian Constitutional Court, the most important form of agenda setting power and act of delegation in decisions of constitutional (il)legitimacy. We estimate a series of econometric models that evaluate the relative importance of the determinants of the creation of these "judicial couples", namely, professional background, political affiliation, age, etc. Professional background is shown to be an important determinant of the creation of the couples, more so with time, although the onset of the Second Republic has reduced its importance. This analysis sheds light into the inner workings of the Italian Constitutional Court and the actual processes through which its jurisprudence is generated.

Keywords: Constitutional Court; Agenda setting; Delegation; Judicial independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server:
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Published in International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, 2011, 32 (2), pp.215-223. ⟨10.1016/j.irle.2012.01.002⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic delegation and “judicial couples” in the Italian Constitutional Court (2012) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2012.01.002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

Page updated 2020-06-26
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00661513