Fight cartels or control mergers? On the optimal allocation of enforcement efforts within competition policy

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais and Jean-Philippe Tropeano

International Review of Law and Economics, 2013, vol. 34, issue C, 34-40

Abstract: This paper deals with the optimal enforcement of competition law between merger and anti-cartel policies. We examine the interaction between these two branches of antitrust, given the budget constraint of the public agency, and taking into account the ensuing incentives for firms in terms of choice between cartels and mergers. To the extent that a tougher anti-cartel action triggers more mergers and vice versa, we show that the two antitrust branches are complementary. However, if the merger's coordinated effect is taken into account, then for a sufficiently large such effect the agency may optimally have to refrain from controlling mergers and instead spend all resources on fighting cartels.

Keywords: Competition law enforcement; Antitrust; Merger control; Anti-cartel policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818812000610
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy (2013)
Working Paper: Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy (2013)
Working Paper: Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy (2013)
Working Paper: Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of Enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy (2011)
Working Paper: Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of Enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:34:y:2013:i:c:p:34-40

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2012.10.002

Access Statistics for this article

International Review of Law and Economics is currently edited by C. Ott, A. W. Katz and H-B. Schäfer

More articles in International Review of Law and Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().