Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais and Jean-Philippe Tropeano

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper deals with the optimal enforcement of competition law between merger and anti-cartel policies. We examine the interaction between these two branches of antitrust, given the budget constraint of the public agency, and taking into account the ensuing incentives for firms in terms of choice between cartels and mergers. To the extent that a tougher anti-cartel action triggers more mergers and vice-versa, we show that the two antitrust branches are complementary. However, if the merger's coordinated effect is taken into account, then for a sufficiently large such effect the agency may optimally have to refrain from controlling mergers and instead spend all resources on fighting cartels.

Date: 2013-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-law
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00977619v1
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Published in International Review of Law and Economics, 2013, 34, pp.34-40. ⟨10.1016/j.irle.2012.10.002⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Fight cartels or control mergers? On the optimal allocation of enforcement efforts within competition policy (2013)
Working Paper: Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy (2013)
Working Paper: Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy (2013)
Working Paper: Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of Enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy (2011)
Working Paper: Fight Cartels or Control Mergers? On the Optimal Allocation of Enforcement Efforts within Competition Policy (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00977619

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2012.10.002

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