Electoral rules and voter turnout

Guglielmo Barone () and Guido de Blasio

International Review of Law and Economics, 2013, vol. 36, issue C, 25-35

Abstract: The paper investigates the effect of electoral rules on voter turnout. It focuses on Italian municipalities, where a single ballot system applies to municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, while a dual ballot system applies above that threshold. By exploiting this discontinuity, the paper finds that the dual ballot increases participation at the local polls by about 1 percentage point. The increase in voter turnout is associated with broader political representation, higher quality politicians, and greater fiscal discipline. Finally, we document that the higher political participation triggered by local electoral rules extends to nationwide voting contexts.

Keywords: Voter turnout; Electoral systems; Regression discontinuity design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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Working Paper: Electoral rules and voter turnout (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:36:y:2013:i:c:p:25-35

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2013.04.001

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