Electoral rules and voter turnout

Guglielmo Barone () and Guido de Blasio

No 833, Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area

Abstract: The paper investigates the effect of electoral rules on voter turnout. It focuses on Italian municipalities, where voting schemes are differentiated by the size of the city: a single ballot system applies to municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, while a dual ballot system is in place above that threshold. By exploiting this discontinuity, the paper finds that the dual ballot increases participation at the local polls, with an estimated effect of about 1 percentage point. The increase in voter turnout is associated with wider political representation, politicians of higher quality, greater fiscal discipline, and more robust local development. Finally, we document that the higher political participation triggered by local electoral rules extends to nationwide voting contexts.

Keywords: voter turnout; electoral systems; regression discontinuity design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Electoral rules and voter turnout (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_833_11

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