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The impact of licensing requirements on industrial organization and labor: Evidence from the U.S. private security market

Brian Meehan ()

International Review of Law and Economics, 2015, vol. 42, issue C, 113-121

Abstract: The consequences of occupational licensing regulations on the private security market are examined. Analysis suggests that these regulations impact the number of private security firms in a state, the distribution of firm size, and the average wage of private security employees. Regulations imposed in some states reduce the number of private security firms, increase the size of firms, and raise average wages in the industry. The hypothesis that some licensing requirements act as barriers to entry is examined, as are arguments that these requirements alleviate asymmetric information problems in the industry.

Keywords: Private security; Occupational licensing; Asymmetric information; Barriers to entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D45 K23 L25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2015.02.001

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International Review of Law and Economics is currently edited by C. Ott, A. W. Katz and H-B. Schäfer

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