Estimating judicial ideal points in the Spanish Supreme Court: The case of administrative review

Lucia Dalla Pellegrina, Nuno Garoupa and Fernando Gómez-Pomar

International Review of Law and Economics, 2017, vol. 52, issue C, 16-28

Abstract: This paper presents an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Spain in the specific area of administrative review for the period 2000–2008, controlling for dissent suppression effort. The estimated ideal points allow us to identify political clusters in the Supreme Court which seem inconsistent with the formal and traditional views that a career judiciary is politically not strongly aligned. At the same time, we find evidence that confirms a trend favoring consensus and dissent avoidance.

Keywords: Career judiciary; Judicial behavior; Empirical legal studies; Spanish supreme court; Ideal point; Ideology; Dissent avoidance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:52:y:2017:i:c:p:16-28

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2017.07.003

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