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Settlement implications of lawyer advertising

Tim Friehe, Yannick Gabuthy and Eve-Angeline Lambert

International Review of Law and Economics, 2020, vol. 61, issue C

Abstract: This paper explores how informative attorney advertising influences the settlement probability and/or offer, using a screening framework. Plaintiffs are privately informed about the expected judgment and their level of ability in controlling the lawyer. More attorney advertising increases case filings by plaintiffs with high or low ability to different extents such that the defendant's beliefs about the plaintiff's type change with the level of attorney advertising. How attorney advertising influences settlement outcomes then depends on whether the defendant offers a higher settlement offer to more able plaintiffs.

Keywords: Attorney advertising; Litigation; Plaintiff heterogeneity; Updating (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2019.105870

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