Market collusion with joint harm and liability sharing

Florian Baumann, Maxime Charreire and Andreea Cosnita-Langlais

International Review of Law and Economics, 2020, vol. 62, issue C

Abstract: When it is impossible to identify ex post the producer of a product causing harm, or the damage caused is indivisible although caused by multiple injurers, courts must apportion the total damage among tortfeasors. In this model we examine how such liability sharing rules affect the likelihood of tacit collusion. For this we use a standard Cournot oligopoly model where firms are collectively held liable for joint harm inflicted on third parties. With repeated market interaction and grim strategies, we investigate the sustainability of collusion to derive some policy implications.

Keywords: Cournot oligopoly; Liability sharing rules; Market collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K13 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Market collusion with joint harm and liability sharing (2020)
Working Paper: Market collusion with joint harm and liability sharing (2019)
Working Paper: Market collusion with joint harm and liability sharing (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:62:y:2020:i:c:s0144818819300481

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2019.105885

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