Market collusion with joint harm and liability sharing

Florian Baumann, Maxime Charreire () and Andreea Cosnita-Langlais
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Maxime Charreire: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: When it is impossible to identify ex post the producer of a product causing harm, or the damage caused is indivisible although caused by multiple injurers, courts must apportion the total damage among tort-feasors. In this model we examine how such liability sharing rules affect the likelihood of tacit collusion. For this we use a standard Cournot oligopoly model where firms are collectively held liable for joint harm inflicted on third parties. With repeated market interaction and grim strategies, we investigate the sustainability of collusion to derive some policy implications

Date: 2020
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Published in International Review of Law and Economics, 2020, 62, ⟨10.1016/j.irle.2019.105885⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Market collusion with joint harm and liability sharing (2020)
Working Paper: Market collusion with joint harm and liability sharing (2019)
Working Paper: Market collusion with joint harm and liability sharing (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02427376

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2019.105885

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