Ex-ante versus Ex-post in competition law enforcement: Blurred boundaries and economic rationale

Patrice Bougette, Oliver Budzinski and Frédéric Marty

International Review of Law and Economics, 2025, vol. 82, issue C

Abstract: This paper explores the evolving landscape of competition law enforcement, focusing on the dynamic interplay between ex-ante and ex-post approaches. Amidst the digital transformation and regulatory shifts, traditional enforcement mechanisms are being re-evaluated. This study aims to dissect the economic rationale behind these shifts, proposing a hybrid framework that balances legal certainty with the flexibility needed to address contemporary market challenges. In particular, the analysis highlights the emergence of new competition policy approaches that combine regulatory-type interventions with strengthened enforcement strategies.

Keywords: Competition law enforcement; Ex-ante and Ex-post approaches; Anticompetitive practices; Merger control; Digital economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 K21 L40 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Related works:
Working Paper: Ex-ante versus Ex-post in Competition Law Enforcement: Blurred Boundaries and Economic Rationale (2025)
Working Paper: Ex-ante versus Ex-post in competition law enforcement: Blurred boundaries and economic rationale (2025)
Working Paper: Ex-ante versus Ex-post in Competition Law Enforcement: Blurred Boundaries and Economic Rationale (2024)
Working Paper: Ex-ante versus Ex-post in Competition Law Enforcement: Blurred Boundaries and Economic Rationale (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:82:y:2025:i:c:s0144818825000201

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106264

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