Ex-ante versus Ex-post in competition law enforcement: Blurred boundaries and economic rationale

Patrice Bougette (), Oliver Budzinski and Frédéric Marty ()
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Patrice Bougette: UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur, GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur
Frédéric Marty: GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur

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Abstract: This paper explores the evolving landscape of competition law enforcement, focusing on the dynamic interplay between ex-ante and ex-post approaches. Amidst the digital transformation and regulatory shifts, traditional enforcement mechanisms are being re-evaluated. This study aims to dissect the economic rationale behind these shifts, proposing a hybrid framework that balances legal certainty with the flexibility needed to address contemporary market challenges. In particular, the analysis highlights the emergence of new competition policy approaches that combine regulatory-type interventions with strengthened enforcement strategies.

Date: 2025-06
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Published in International Review of Law and Economics, 2025, 82, pp.106264. ⟨10.1016/j.irle.2025.106264⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05026352

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106264

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