Ex-ante versus ex-post in competition law enforcement: Blurred boundaries and economic rationale

Patrice Bougette, Oliver Budzinski and Frédéric Marty

No 195, Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers from Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics

Abstract: This paper explores the evolving landscape of competition law enforcement, focusing on the dynamic interplay between ex-ante and ex-post approaches. Amidst the digital transformation and regulatory shifts, traditional enforcement mechanisms are being reevaluated. This study aims to dissect the economic rationale behind these shifts, proposing a hybrid framework that balances legal certainty with the flexibility needed to address contemporary market challenges. In particular, the analysis highlights the emergence of new competition policy approaches that combine regulatory-type interventions with strengthened enforcement strategies.

Keywords: Competition Law Enforcement; Ex-ante and Ex-post Approaches; Anticompetitive Practices; Merger Control; Digital Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 K21 L40 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/335037/1/1949089398.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Ex-ante versus Ex-post in competition law enforcement: Blurred boundaries and economic rationale (2025)
Working Paper: Ex-ante versus Ex-post in Competition Law Enforcement: Blurred Boundaries and Economic Rationale (2025)
Working Paper: Ex-ante versus Ex-post in competition law enforcement: Blurred boundaries and economic rationale (2025)
Working Paper: Ex-ante versus Ex-post in Competition Law Enforcement: Blurred Boundaries and Economic Rationale (2024)
Working Paper: Ex-ante versus Ex-post in Competition Law Enforcement: Blurred Boundaries and Economic Rationale (2024)
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