CEO incentives and bank risk over the business cycle
Steven Ongena,
Tanseli Savaser and
Elif Sisli Ciamarra
Journal of Banking & Finance, 2022, vol. 138, issue C
Abstract:
We examine whether the relationship between managerial risk-taking incentives and bank risk is sensitive to the underlying macroeconomic conditions. We find that risk-taking incentives provided to bank executives are associated with higher bank riskiness during economic downturns. We attribute this finding to the increase in moral hazard during macroeconomic downturns when the perceived probability of future bailouts and government guarantees rises. This association is particularly strong for larger banks, banks that maintain lower capital ratios and banks that are managed by more powerful Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). Our findings highlight the importance of the interaction between managerial incentives and the macroeconomic environment. Boards and regulators may find it useful to consider the countercyclical nature of the relationship between risk-taking incentives and bank riskiness when designing managerial compensation.
Keywords: Bank risk; Executive compensation; Equity-based compensation; Macroeconomy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G2 G3 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426622000607
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
Working Paper: CEO Incentives and Bank Risk over the Business Cycle (2020) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:138:y:2022:i:c:s0378426622000607
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106460
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Banking & Finance is currently edited by Ike Mathur
More articles in Journal of Banking & Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().