Voluntary disclosure of individual supervisory board compensation in public family firms

Pascal J. Engel, Andreas Hack, Laura J. Stanley and Franz Kellermanns

Journal of Business Research, 2019, vol. 101, issue C, 362-374

Abstract: In family firms, the decision to voluntarily disclose individual supervisory board compensation induces confidence in the family firm's governance system, but may also compromise a family's efforts to keep exclusive control. Drawing on socioemotional wealth (SEW) research, we investigate family influence on a firm's voluntary disclosure decisions while distinguishing between different types of firms: non-family, true family (TFF), and lone founder firms (LFF). Our findings demonstrate the complex influence of two control-enhancing factors, family CEO and high ownership concentration, on disclosure decisions.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Family firms; Socioemotional wealth; Voluntary disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0148296319302759
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:101:y:2019:i:c:p:362-374

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.04.025

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Business Research is currently edited by A. G. Woodside

More articles in Journal of Business Research from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().