 The risks of mergers and acquisitions—Analyzing the incentives for risk reporting in Item 1A of 10-K filingsChristian Ott Journal of Business Research, 2020, vol. 106, issue C, 158-181 Abstract: This paper investigates the motivations behind the associations between the M&A risk level and the M&A risk reporting. For a sample of 231 M&As, I performed a detailed content analysis of Item 1A of the 10-K filing after the completion of M&As. While the M&A risk reporting quantity captures the number of M&A risk factors, the M&A risk reporting quality additionally reflects the M&A risk reporting depth and width. The results suggest that the M&A risk reporting quantity and quality are related but not identical theoretical constructs. Overall, consistent with the transparency motivation, a higher M&A risk level encourages managers to increase the M&A risk reporting quantity and quality. Managers will disclose more M&A risk factors if the target firm is relatively large and from a foreign country, a relatively large amount of the purchase price is allocated to goodwill, and the M&A intensity is high. Keywords: Risk reporting; Risk level; Goodwill; Purchase price allocation; Content analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:106:y:2020:i:c:p:158-181 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.08.028 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Business Research is currently edited by A. G. Woodside More articles in Journal of Business Research from Elsevier |
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