A tiger with wings: CEO–board surname ties and agency costs
Liang Zhang,
Zhe Zhang,
Ming Jia and
Yeyao Ren
Journal of Business Research, 2020, vol. 118, issue C, 271-285
Abstract:
Although corporate governance literature recognizes the influence of acquired social ties between CEOs and directors, innate social ties are hardly explored. To extend this literature, this study examines how CEO–board surname ties influence agency costs. Drawing on social identity theory, we first develop the argument that CEO–board surname ties result in increased agency costs. We then employ agency theory to examine the boundary conditions under which such directors are less likely to act as group members of surname ties. Specifically, we consider three key governance tools as such conditions, namely, monitoring by shareholders, aligning directors’ interests with firm value, and aligning supervisors’ interests with firm value. We find empirical support for our arguments by using a sample of 16,926 listed firms and 165,287 directors in China from 2005 to 2015. We discuss the contributions to corporate governance literature and elucidate the practical implications of our findings.
Keywords: Surname ties; Agency costs; Corporate governance; Social identity theory; Agency theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0148296320304008
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:118:y:2020:i:c:p:271-285
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2020.06.026
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Business Research is currently edited by A. G. Woodside
More articles in Journal of Business Research from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().