Tactical termination of contractual services – An analysis of the phenomenon and its determinants

Mona Hagebölling, Barbara Seegebarth and David M. Woisetschläger

Journal of Business Research, 2021, vol. 137, issue C, 170-181

Abstract: Due to the target-group-specific pricing policies of service providers, different prices exist for the same service across customer groups, like new or lost customers compared to existing customers. Current customers may notice these offers but do not receive any benefits for their loyalty. Consequently, they may react with a tactical termination to obtain better offers from their current provider without having a clear intention to switch. Thus, this study examines the phenomenon of tactical termination and its determinants through a mixed method approach across different service contexts. The findings provide evidence for the phenomenon of tactical termination as a particular type of customer defection behavior and provide insights into a new outcome variable in contractual relationships. The study shows that social influences have the strongest impact on tactical termination, followed by price fairness and interactional fairness.

Keywords: Customer loyalty; Price discrimination; Fairness; Contractual services (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:137:y:2021:i:c:p:170-181

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2021.08.015

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