When a dominant CEO hinders exploration in a firm: A longitudinal case study from Japan
Kenji Matsuo
Journal of Business Research, 2022, vol. 140, issue C, 143-154
Abstract:
This study aims to elucidate when, how, and why a dominant CEO hinders exploration, by using a longitudinal case study of a Japanese firm. Many studies suggest that dominant CEOs facilitate exploration; however, two problems cause researchers to overlook failures: they did not fully consider the context or perform a long-term analysis. Although some studies argue the negative influence of dominant CEOs on firms' performance, they neither fully clarify the mechanisms nor explicitly address exploration. Our study argues that when board power is weak, and a dominant CEO exercises his/her power coercively, exploration-related activities can be hindered. First, a dominant CEO can suppress at will resource allocation for exploration. Second, technological adaptation can be inhibited by a dominant CEO’s explicit and implicit influence. Third, when a dominant CEO sets stretch goals for exploration and coercively demands their achievement, market development failure could occur.
Keywords: Board power; CEO Power; Contexts; Critical realism; Exercise of power; Exploration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:140:y:2022:i:c:p:143-154
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2021.11.042
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