Unequal participation in joint new product development: The roles of information opportunism concern and contract binding force

Qingtao Wang, Julie Juan Li and Defeng Yang

Journal of Business Research, 2022, vol. 145, issue C, 21-34

Abstract: Partners involved in joint new product development may not participate and/or contribute equally. This study identifies two types of unequal participation: unequal participation due to passive opportunism (i.e., unequal information participation) and unequal participation due to the nature of the business transaction (i.e., unequal co-developer participation). This study further examines how unequal participation may lead to joint new product development inefficiency due to concerns about information opportunism (i.e., about information collection and unauthorized use) and contract binding force. Empirical results from 400 matched channel cooperative dyads in China reveal that both unequal information participation and unequal co-developer participation hinder value co-creation. In addition, concern about information opportunism strengthens the negative effects of unequal participation on value co-creation. Furthermore, we find that the moderating effect of information opportunism concern is less likely to be negative when contract binding force is greater. These findings provide novel insights for managing inter-firm value co-creation in joint new product development.

Keywords: Value co-creation; Unequal participation; Information opportunism concern; Contract binding force; Joint new product development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0148296322001540
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:145:y:2022:i:c:p:21-34

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.02.033

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Business Research is currently edited by A. G. Woodside

More articles in Journal of Business Research from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().