Type I and type II agency conflicts in family firms: An empirical investigation

Saptarshi Purkayastha, Rajaram Veliyath and Rejie George

Journal of Business Research, 2022, vol. 153, issue C, 285-299

Abstract: Dominant family control reduces Type I agency conflicts because of monitoring efficiencies, while increasing Type II agency conflicts because of the family’s voting power. Additionally, Type II agency conflicts could be exacerbated if the family agents managed the firm solely for the family’s benefit. The two different types of agency conflicts were examined in a sample of 499 public Indian family businesses during the years 2006 to 2015. Family-controlled and non-family-managed firms appeared to be optimally configured to minimize both types of agency conflicts. The absence of management control appeared to alleviate some of the dissipative agency conflict effects of dominant family ownership.

Keywords: Family business; Type I agency conflicts; Type II agency conflicts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0148296322006634
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:153:y:2022:i:c:p:285-299

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.07.054

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Business Research is currently edited by A. G. Woodside

More articles in Journal of Business Research from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().