CEO tenure and strategic time horizons: Exploring the trajectory of decision-making
Maximilian Weis
Journal of Business Research, 2025, vol. 200, issue C
Abstract:
This paper examines how a CEO’s strategic time horizon—the temporal distance considered when making strategic decisions—evolves across their tenure. While upper echelons research links CEO cognition to firm outcomes, it often overlooks shifts occurring throughout a CEO’s tenure. Drawing on tenure-based models and cognitive psychology, the study theorizes an inverted U-shaped relationship: early-tenure CEOs focus on short-term goals to build credibility, mid-tenure CEOs adopt long-term perspectives as power grows, and late-tenure CEOs return to short-term priorities due to legacy concerns. The study also explores differences between insider and outsider CEOs, proposing that outsider CEOs maintain shorter time horizons throughout. Using growth modeling on data from 1,034 S&P 900 CEOs between 2004 and 2022, the findings support the hypothesized trajectory and moderation effect. The study contributes to upper echelons theory, CEO tenure research, and behavioral strategy by highlighting the dynamic and context-dependent nature of CEO temporal decision-making.
Keywords: Temporality; CEO; Time horizon; CEO tenure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:200:y:2025:i:c:s0148296325004722
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2025.115649
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