 Forecast information and traditional retailer performance in a dual-channel competitive marketRuiliang Yan and Sanjoy Ghose Journal of Business Research, 2010, vol. 63, issue 1, 77-83 Abstract: Independent firms in a dual-channel competitive market are expected to have their own information about the nature of the market. In this research, we develop a game-theoretic model to examine the value of forecast information about consumers' willingness to pay. The model is based on a simultaneously played Bertrand game. Our results indicate that the profits of online as well as traditional retailers always increase with forecast accuracy, and that forecast accuracy has a greater effect on the performance of the traditional retailer than on that of the online retailer. Our results also show that the difference in profit between that of the traditional retailer and the online retailer increases with forecast accuracy. In addition we find that forecast accuracy is much more valuable to the traditional retailer when there is an increasing volatility in the market, an increasing level of consumer valuation of the product, and an increasing intensity in market competition. Based on our results, we derive optimal market strategies and identify directions of future research. Keywords: Forecast; information; Channel; competition; Uncertainty; modeling; Bertrand; competition; game; Marketing; research (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:63:y:2010:i:1:p:77-83 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Business Research is currently edited by A. G. Woodside More articles in Journal of Business Research from Elsevier |
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