Marketing tactics discouraging price search: Deception and competition

Joan Lindsey-Mullikin and Ross D. Petty

Journal of Business Research, 2011, vol. 64, issue 1, 67-73

Abstract: Retailers attempt to assure consumers that their deals are bargains using a variety of marketing tactics. Because consumers continue information and price searches until satisfied with the amount of the information to make a purchase, such bargain assurances (BAs) can change consumers' shopping behavior. This article identifies twelve common BAs and reviews extant marketing literature to derive evidence of how BAs affect consumers' purchasing behavior. It then examines how these practices are regulated to prevent consumer deception or a reduction in competition. This article concludes by offering three policy recommendations: BAs influence consumers and require regulation; the regulation of BAs demands a comprehensive rather than a piecemeal approach; and consumer policy should facilitate and encourage accurate price comparisons.

Keywords: Deception; Pricing; Competition; Marketing; tactics; Search; behavior; Legal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:64:y:2011:i:1:p:67-73

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