Information asymmetry, pricing strategy and firm's performance in the retailer- multi-channel manufacturer supply chain
Ruiliang Yan and
Zhi Pei
Journal of Business Research, 2011, vol. 64, issue 4, 377-384
Abstract:
In this research paper, we assume a retailer-multi-channel manufacturer (with online and traditional retail channels) supply chain where both the multi-channel manufacturer and the retailer have private information about the state of consumer demand. In this setting, we examine the effect of an information sharing strategy on both firms' performance. Our results show that the multi-channel manufacturer always benefits from an information sharing strategy. When the product is highly compatible with the online channel, information sharing becomes much more valuable to the multi-channel manufacturer. On the other hand, the retailer's performance is not impacted by an information sharing strategy. Thus, a bargaining model is utilized to implement profit sharing for the multi-channel manufacturer and retailer so that an information sharing equilibrium can be reached. Based on our results, we derive optimal market strategies and identify probable paths of future research.
Keywords: Online; marketing; Asymmetric; information; Information; sharing; Retailing; Supply; chain; management; Game; theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:64:y:2011:i:4:p:377-384
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