CEO turnover and shareholder wealth: Evidence from CEO power in Taiwan

Hsiu-I Ting

Journal of Business Research, 2013, vol. 66, issue 12, 2466-2472

Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between CEO turnovers and shareholder wealth and/or the volatility of firm performance, and examines whether CEO power matters in this relationship. Successors tend to possess less power than predecessors. The announcement effects of CEO turnovers present higher abnormal returns for turnovers in which predecessors and successors share a similar power level and a lower volatility for turnovers in which successors have less power. Volatility is lower and liquidity is higher when CEO turnovers involve successors with less power.

Keywords: Turnovers; CEO power; Announcement effect; Shareholder wealth; Volatility; Liquidity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:66:y:2013:i:12:p:2466-2472

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2013.05.036

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