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Cash holdings and business group membership

Rosy Locorotondo, Nico Dewaelheyns and Cynthia Van Hulle

Journal of Business Research, 2014, vol. 67, issue 3, 316-323

Abstract: This study examines the cash policies of business group members (i.e., affiliates). Using a panel dataset of private Belgian affiliates and comparable non-affiliated firms, the empirical results show that business group affiliates hold significantly smaller amounts of cash as compared to non-affiliated firms. This finding is consistent with the notion that affiliates can afford to keep lower cash reserves because these firms can access the internal capital market of the group. The analysis also combines affiliate level and group level data to evaluate cash drivers and shows that groups in financial distress reduce cash holdings in affiliates. However, affiliates that are more important for the group's reputation and operations maintain cash levels comparable to affiliates belonging to financially healthy groups.

Keywords: Cash holdings; Internal capital markets; Business groups; Moral hazard; Financial distress (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:67:y:2014:i:3:p:316-323

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2013.01.019

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