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Settlement agreement types of federal corporate prosecution in the U.S. and their impact on shareholder wealth

Christian Flore, Sascha Kolaric and Dirk Schiereck

Journal of Business Research, 2017, vol. 76, issue C, 145-158

Abstract: This paper analyzes the shareholder wealth effects of corporate prosecution settlements in the U.S. from 2001 to 2014. We focus on the relative monetary size of the settlement and on deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements in contrast to traditional plea agreements. The results show that the settlement of criminal prosecution leads to positive shareholder wealth effects, which may be due to the resolution of any remaining uncertainty with respect to the total settlement amount and lower than expected settlement costs. Stockholders generally view the announcement of plea agreements more positively than the announcement of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements. The likelihood of a certain agreement type is strongly dependent on the crime committed. Moreover, larger firms with better board-related governance structures that have not been criminally prosecuted prior to the settlement are more likely to avoid a criminal conviction.

Keywords: Corporate misconduct; Legal penalties; Settlements; Shareholder wealth; Event study (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G30 K10 K41 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:76:y:2017:i:c:p:145-158

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2017.03.015

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