Creditor passivity: The effects of bank competition and institutions on the strategic use of bankruptcy filings

Christa Hainz

Journal of Comparative Economics, 2009, vol. 37, issue 4, 582-596

Abstract: In transition countries, banks often fail to take action against loan defaulters. Using a model of the bank-firm relationship, we study the trade-off a bank faces when having defaulting firms declared bankrupt. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it provides information about a firm's type to its competitors. Therefore, asymmetric information between banks is reduced, and bank competition intensifies. We find that the better the institutions and the more competitive the banking sector, the greater the bank's incentive to bankrupt defaulting firms. This makes information between banks less asymmetric and thus leads to lower interest rates and increases the probability that all banks offer loans.

Keywords: Creditor; passivity; Bank; competition; Information; sharing; Institutions; Bankruptcy; Relationship; banking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Creditor Passivity: The Effects of Bank Competition and Institutions on the Strategic Use of Bankruptcy Filings (2007)
Working Paper: Creditor Passivity: The Effects of Bank Competition and Institutions on the Strategic Use of Bankruptcy Filings (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:37:y:2009:i:4:p:582-596

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